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Theme: The April 2008 India-Africa Forum Summit not only marked the zenith of India-
African cooperation following intensified cultural, political and economic interactions 
between India and African countries, but also the increased competition with China over 
access to Africa’s resources and markets. The author reviews India’s development 
cooperation with African economies. 
 
 
Summary: The exceptionally fast growth of big economies like China and India has 
resulted in a new-found interest in the economic and political consequences of this growth 
for the developed economies. Recently, traditional donors’ concern that ‘emerging’ donors 
were re-emerging on the development scene was addressed. This kicked off a quest 
among donor agencies, think tanks and researchers alike to identify and establish the 
doings of these ‘emerging’ donors. To date, however, China has received most attention 
while the doings of other donors like India, Brazil and South Africa have remained virtually 
invisible. This ARI describes India’s current engagement in Africa and analyses the 
reasons why India once again puts Africa high on its political agenda. It argues that the 








In April 2008, 14 African heads of state and leaders of eight African regional groups 
gathered in New Delhi, with their Indian host, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, to 
inaugurate the 1st India-Africa Forum Summit. The summit not only marked the zenith of 
India-African cooperation following intensified cultural, political and economic interactions 
between India and African countries, but also the increased competition with China over 
access to Africa’s resources and markets. 
 
While African countries have never been a prime destination for Indian trade and 
investments, economic flows between the two regions have increased dramatically in the 
past 20 years, and in the past half dozen years oil- and mineral-rich African countries 
have experienced an upsurge of interest from Indian companies such as ONGC Videsh, 
the overseas arm of India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and Indian Oil and Reliance 
Petroleum. Likewise, Africa is high on the agenda in India’s quest to change the world’s 
perception of the country from being a developing country in need of aid to being a 
developed country able to provide aid to the needy, and African votes are essential in 
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gaining a seat in an enlarged UN Security Council if India’s quest to reform the UN system 
is to be successful. Finally, security issues place Africa at the centre of India’s foreign 
policies as Africa is India’s offshore neighbour across the Indian Ocean. 
 
India is not the only country courting Africa. China is eagerly engaging African countries 
via high-level visits, aid, investment, trade and military support. Like India China seeks 
access to resources, investment possibilities and new markets in Africa. African countries 
have thus become a new arena for India and China’s power struggles.1
 
However, while Chinese political and economic engagement with Africa is highly topical, 
India’s engagement with Africa has not attracted much attention. This brief seeks to 
further our understanding of the complex nature of India’s engagement with African 
countries and the role of development herein. 
 
India’s Africa Policy in Historical Perspective 
India’s relations with African countries date back centuries, and with varying degrees of 
importance, Africa has been part of India’s foreign policy since independence in 1947. 
Mahatma Gandhi led the way. During his stay in South Africa in the late 19th and the 
beginning of the 20th Centuries, Gandhi gained first-hand experience with racism and he 
became personally involved in the anti-colonial movement in South Africa. Nehru built on 
this relationship in his quest for liberation of all nations under colonial rule and was one of 
the founding fathers of the 1955 Bandung Conference, which in turn paved the way first 
for the Non-Aligned Movement and later for the Group of 77. In the late 60s and early 70s 
South-South cooperation was high on the agenda and both India and African countries 
played important roles. The oil crisis of the 70s, however, split the South and South-South 
cooperation came to exist in name but not in substance. 
 
This situation was mirrored in India’s relations with Africa. But for a few visits by Rajiv 
Gandhi to front-line states of Southern Africa and the establishment of a special fund to 
support them, Africa did not figure in India’s foreign policy agenda in the 1980s. Following 
India’s liberalisation programme in the beginning of the 1990s, however, Indian 
companies began to look for new markets and investment possibilities outside India, 
including in regions with large Indian diasporas, such as Eastern and Southern Africa. 
Indian foreign policy followed suit at the turn of the millennium after India’s much criticised 
nuclear tests in 1998, which resulted in worldwide condemnation and sanctions and 
India’s reformulation of its foreign policy that came to include (countries in) Africa (much 
like the Tiananmen massacre a decade earlier had made China turn to her ‘all-weather 
friends’ in Africa). According to an observer of Indian foreign policy (and Africa’s role 
therein), Lalit Mansingh, this policy centres on the following keys issues: a focus on key 
partnership countries (especially neighbouring countries), particular attention to economic 
aspects including possibilities of trade, investments and energy security, and protection of 
borders and territorial integrity. With the exception of geographical proximity, Africa fits 
very well into this agenda.2
 
 
India’s Quest for International Recognition: The Role of Development Cooperation 
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Just like most other donors, India’s development cooperation is an integral part of its 
foreign policy and development cooperation is used to facilitate trade and investment. In 
fact, India’s development cooperation is closely linked to these other financial flows, and 
most often it is impossible to distinguish the aid component, ie, what is known as ‘official 
development assistance’ (ODA) in OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) 
parlance, from ‘other official flows’, comprising funds from governments that do not meet 
the criteria for ODA. This, however, is not unusual. In fact, it is a characteristic of most 
Asian aid today. 
 
Even if India’s development cooperation programme only recently has received media 
and scholarly attention, it is by no means new. It began in the 1950s, first targeting 
neighbouring countries with economic as well as military aid, and from the beginning of 
the 1960s, as a direct consequence of the competition with China, India also began to 
target countries in Africa. Since then India’s interest in Africa, and thus its use of 
development cooperation to further its interest on the African continent, has fluctuated. 
From an important, though financially small, instrument in the 1960s and 1970s, India lost 
its interest in development cooperation as a foreign policy tool in the 1980s and 1990s 
and changed its perception of aid again in this millennium, now seeing it as an instrument 
to gain political and economic influence. Therefore, the then Minister of Finance, Jaswant 
Singh, decided in 2003 to use development cooperation, or rather, a shift from mostly 
being an aid recipient to also being an aid donor, as a means to get more international 
political leverage, and ultimately obtain a seat in (an enlarged) UN Security Council. He, 
therefore, made an effort to downsize India’s relationship with (small) external donors 
resulting in a situation where India now only accepts bilateral aid from eight bilateral 
donors and the EU. Simultaneously, he launched the ‘India Development Initiative’. These 
two initiatives, the shift in status and the launch of a new initiative, were perceived as a 
means to brand India anew: the world’s attention had to be diverted away from India’s 
internal problems of poverty and inequality towards its role as an emerging economy. 
 
India’s Development Cooperation Programmes in Africa 
Although India’s development cooperation has been, and still is, minuscule compared with 
both China and the big traditional donors, it comprises several different programmes. 
Historically, the most important programme has been the Indian Technical and Economic 
Co-operation (ITEC), which was initiated in 1964 and is still running. According to the 
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), India currently transfers Rs500 million (US$10.3 
million) a year via this programme. Even though it also targets African countries, the main 
beneficiaries of this programme are countries located in India’s immediate periphery. 
Basically, ITEC uses a slots system to allocate aid. Slots may then be exchanged into five 
different aid modalities, namely: (1) training of personnel in India; (2) project aid; (3) 
technical assistance; (4) study trips; and (5) humanitarian assistance. The MEA allocates 
slots to India’s cooperating partners reflecting the economic and/or political importance 
India gives each country. The slots are adjusted on a yearly basis and recently a number 
of African countries (to a large degree coinciding with the TEAM-9 countries, see below) 
have had their ITEC slots increased. During its life-span of close to 50 years, a total of 
US$1 billion has been transferred from India to other developing countries via this 
programme. 
 
ITEC has a sister programme called the Special Commonwealth Assistance for Africa 
Programme (SCAAP). Basically, it makes use of the same aid modalities as ITEC but, 
unlike ITEC, only targets African countries in the Commonwealth (19 in all). However, not 
all African Commonwealth countries are targeted with the same degree of eagerness and 
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offered the same conditions. Rather, SCAAP units, which can be exchanged with any of 
the five aid modalities, are allocated according to the perceived importance of the 
recipient country for India (just like the ITEC slots). Hence, countries like Mauritius, South 
Africa and Uganda (with large Indian diasporas and/or economic importance) receive a 
relatively large number of slots, while countries with hardly any Indian diaspora, no natural 
resources and no economic influence receive only a tiny amount of slots. 
 
India also offers scholarships to overseas students (university courses at various levels, 
professional courses and courses linked to Indian music, dance and art) via the Indian 
Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR) scholarship scheme. By far the majority of the slots 
offered with this scheme go to neighbouring countries, but during the 2009-10 academic 
year some 15% of the slots will go to African countries. Like the ITEC and the SCAAP, 
India uses this scheme geo-politically. Hence, countries like Mauritius (40), South Africa 
(25) and Kenya (20) are allocated far more scholarships than, say, Cameroon (1), Guinea 
(1) and Togo (1). 
 
No doubt the transfers from India to her African partners were small in the first three or 
four decades of the programmes’ existence and although India’s development assistance 
to Africa is still insignificant in financial terms, it has been boosted massively over the last 
few years. The new importance given to development cooperation was sparked by the 
2003 budget speech, which set the unsuccessful ‘India Development Initiative’ in motion. 
Since then, numerous schemes with a particular focus on Africa have been launched, 
totalling Rs26.7 billion (US$547 million) in 2008. Hardly any of these would be categorised 
as ODA in a strict DAC sense of the term. Rather, they are amalgamations of grants, 
contributions to international organisations and international financial institutions, direct 
loans and subsidies for preferential bilateral loans. 
 
Among the most important new initiatives is the Focus Africa Programme (2002-07) 
totalling US$550 million, administered by the Export Import Bank of India. Essentially, it 
seeks to enhance commercial links between India and African countries by offering export 
subsidies to Indian companies trading with African nations and tied lines of credit to 
African governments and regional entities. Likewise, the Techno Economic Approach for 
Africa India Movement (TEAM-9) is important. It provides eight West African countries 
with credit lines worth US$500 million. Just as the other Indian aid programmes, the focus 
of TEAM-9 also reflects India’s political-economic interests. Hence, the TEAM 9 countries 
overlap with countries courted by Indian oil companies, and much of the assistance 
provided by India is tied to purchases of products and services from India. In addition, 
India has offered NEPAD a US$200 million credit line and is funding the Pan-African E-
Network with US$100 million. Moreover, India offers bilateral debt relief (by 2008, India 
had written off debt totalling US$24 million), UN peace-keeping operations and 
humanitarian assistance to several African countries. 
 
These initiatives seem to bear fruit for the Indian private sector: in 2007, India’s trade with 
Africa was valued at US$30 billion –almost a tenfold increase from 2000– and according 
to Indian observers this figure is likely to increase even more in the years to come, 
reaching US$150 billion by 2012. This picture is mirrored by Indian investments in Africa, 
which come in all shapes and sizes (and ownership patterns), ranging from small family 
firms to large multinational enterprises in the manufacturing, construction and 
telecommunication sectors.3
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Scaling Up Development Cooperation: The India-Africa Summit 
The April 2008 India-Africa summit in New Delhi, attended by heads of state of 14 African 
countries and leaders of the main regional groupings, marked the culmination of India’s 
renewed focus on Africa. It was spurred largely by India’s desire to change the world’s 
perception of it –away from being a recipient to being a donor– in order to boost its global 
political position. Moreover, it was a realisation that political ties have lagged behind the 
growing economic ties between India and certain African countries. However, there were 
more reasons: India’s competition with China played a major role in setting up the summit, 
and it was also seen as a way to reinvent and rejuvenate an old relationship between 
India and Africa (NAM and South-South relations) and thereby influence the global 
political and economic agenda. Just as important, however, was India’s aim to diversify its 
energy resources (India currently imports 20% of its oil imports from Africa –11% from 
Nigeria–) and create market access for Indian products and pave way for Indian 
investments in Africa. 
 
The India-Africa summit resulted in the adoption of two documents: the India-Africa 
Framework for Cooperation Forum and the Delhi Declaration. Like China’s 2006 Africa 
Policy and the Beijing Action Plan 2007-09 that came out of the much hyped 3rd Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation held in Beijing in November 2006, the Framework for 
Cooperation lists several areas (and sub-areas) for cooperation such as economic 
cooperation, political cooperation, science, technology and research, social development, 
tourism, and infrastructure, energy and environment, and lists a number of focus areas 
therein, for instance, agriculture, trade, regional integration, peace and security, ICT, and 
culture. In that sense, the Cooperation Framework is nothing new. What is really 
interesting, though, is the vague wording of the form (cooperation, sharing of experiences 
and capacity building) and the extremely few concrete initiatives, that have lacked any 
reference to costs, agency of implementation and time frames. On the other hand, one 
thing is clear: the focus is on South–South cooperation (especially towards establishing a 
new World order) and particular attention was given to interaction between equal partners. 
 
In addition to the Framework, the partners agreed to develop a plan of action and follow-
up mechanisms to implement it. Since the summit, India has announced several financial 
development pledges including a US$5.4 billion credit line over the next five years 
(increasing from US$2.15 billion in the past five years), grants worth US$500 million over 
the next five years (including a 60% increase in the 2009 financial year to US$20 million) 
and a unilateral opening of India’s economy for exports from all LDCs (34 African). 
 
Conclusion: India has again acknowledged the importance of African countries in global 
governance. Hence, cooperation with African countries has recently been scaled-up and 
publicised massively. India’s development assistance, however, is still small in terms of 
funds transferred, but it is not insignificant. Moreover, it can create a new platform for 
South-South dialogue and it is framed as a partnership between equal partners, which 
can enhance its developmental aspect. India’s development assistance is totally linked to 
India’s own capabilities and its interests in Africa. It is a combination of tied project aid and 




                                                                                                                                                   
the New Millennium’, Geography Compass. 
 5








Thus, India’s development cooperation to a large extent mirrors that of China –though on 
a much smaller scale–. It uses aid to facilitate other financial flows and the modalities are 
somewhat similar, ie, comprising technical assistance, few grants, export credits, debt 
relief and unilateral zero-tariff access for African products. Likewise, India refrains from 
the use of political and economic conditionalities in its development cooperation 
programme. 
 
India benefits from its invisibility and has so far managed to escape external criticism of its 
approach to development cooperation. Instead, China’s ‘no strings attached’ approach 
has (rightly or wrongly) absorbed all of this. However, India can only maintain this position 
as long as the financial flows remain minuscule and India has to prepare herself for 
external scrutiny that might end up in criticism of its approach to development. 
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